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COMMENTS
EXTENDING CHILD ABUSE PROTECTION
TO THE VIABLE FETUS: WHITNER V.
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
INTRODUCTION
Systems of law serve to protect individual rights from
unlawful intrusions by the state. Arguably, the most fun-
damental aspect of such legal regimes is the protection from
physical harm. As the most vulnerable members of society,
children are guaranteed protection from child abuse in-
flicted upon them by all adults, including their own par-
ents. The only entity more vulnerable than a child is a fe-
tus. Although an entirely separate being, the fetus is
completely dependent upon the woman who conceived it.'
The fetus' inability to protect itself from any type of harm
raises the issue of whether those fundamental protections
afforded to a child under existing laws should originate be-
fore birth. Recently, in Whitner v. State of South Carolina,2
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a viable fetus
was a "person" within the meaning of the Children's Code
and could be the victim of criminal child neglect just as any
child could after birth.3 It is the scope of such child abuse
protection that is presently in dispute.
' See Ariela R. Dubler, Monitoring Motherhood, 106 YALE L.J. 935, 939 (1996).
While a fetus may, with medical assistance, survive outside the womb as early as
the end of the second trimester, fetal viability prior to this point is highly doubtful.
DAVID F. MOFFETT, E' AL., HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY 736 (1993).
2 No. 24468, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
3 Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *21.
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Cornelia Whitner was a 28-year old woman from Pick-
ens County, South Carolina with a minimal education and
a serious drug addiction In 1992, Whitner continued
abusing crack cocaine during her third trimester of preg-
nancy and subsequently gave birth to a child with cocaine
residue in his system.5 Whitner, who had prior convictions
for theft and cocaine possession,6 was charged with crimi-
nal child neglect for using an illicit drug during the later
stages of her pregnancy.7 Whitner was sentenced to eight
years in prison after her guilty plea, but gained release just
nineteen months later when the ACLU learned of her case.'
At that time, a state court judge ruled that the child neglect
law did not apply to prenatal drug use and issued an order
for Post Conviction Relief for Whitner.9 The South Carolina
Supreme Court, however, reinstated Whitner's conviction
for criminal child neglect in July of 1996, reversing the
prior decision for Post Conviction Relief. °
' Lyle Denniston, Abortion, Fetus Rights on Legal Collision Course, Protections
for Unborn Head for Test in Fla., BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 4, 1996, at 1A.
5 Id.; John Carlson, State Law Fails to Protect Fetus from Chemical Abusing
Mother, NEWS TRIB., July 24, 1996, at A9; Stephanie Stone, Conduct During Preg-
nancy Harming Fetus May Be Prosecuted, South Carolina High Court Holds,
WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, July 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 405681.
6 Carlson, supra note 5, at A9.
7 Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *3; see also Carlson, supra note 5, at A9;
Marilyn Kaufus, Pregnancy Negligence Not Prosecuted/Law: Taking Speed and
Other Drugs Might Be Bad for the Body, but in California It's Typically Not Treated
As a Crime, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 11, 1996, at B7.
" Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *3; see also Carlson, supra note 5, at A9.
The ACLU challenges these types of prosecutions under the theory that child abuse
statutes were meant to include children and not fetuses. Brian Maffly, Prosecuting
Fetal Abuse Isn't Easy, County is Bucking Odds Prosecuting Fetal Abuse, SALT LAKE
TRIB., May 7, 1996, at Al. The ACLU contends that prosecutions have decreased
because cases usually end with acquittals or reversals on appeal. Id. Prosecutors
have a lesser burden when proving criminal child abuse than when proving a homi-
cide. Id. In a child abuse case, the state need only prove that the pregnant mother
knew that her conduct could be harmful; in a homicide prosecution, however, the
state must show that the baby's death was a direct result of exposure to drugs. Id.
" Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *3.
'o Id. at *2. The statute at issue prescribes the legal obligation of an individual.
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who
shall, without lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to provide, as defined in
§ 20-7-490, the proper care and attention for such child or helpless person,
so that the life, health or comfort of such child or helpless person is endan-
gered or is likely to be endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and
shall be punished within the discretion of the circuit court.
Id. at *5 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (1985)). The South Carolina statute
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The Whitner court held, in a 3-2 decision, that Cornelia
Whitner's prenatal drug use constituted criminal child ne-
glect.1 Facing the issue of when a fetus is entitled to pro-
tection, the court held that a viable fetus was a "person" for
purposes of the Children's Code.' It is submitted that the
Supreme Court of South Carolina correctly decided that a
viable fetus was a "person" entitled to protection from
criminal child neglect.
The South Carolina Supreme Court rested its position,
in large part, upon existing medical information regarding
fetal development. 3 It is well documented that maternal
cocaine use during pregnancy can cause serious harm to the
viable fetus. 4 The causal connection between Cornelia
Whitner's drug use and the injury to her child was not in
dispute. The court reasoned that injuries sustained while a
fetus is in its mother's womb can often be far more serious
than those sustained after birth.5 The Supreme Court of
South Carolina interpreted the statute very broadly to en-
compass all those children, born and unborn, in need of pro-
tection."
Originally, fetal rights were interpreted as merely pro-
tecting unborn children from third parties; the legislatures
and the courts did not initially imagine the mother as a po-
tential offender.' The Whitner court boldly defied this an-
wielded a maximum penalty of ten years in prison for abuse to a fetus. This provi-
sion has been amended twice since Ms. Whitner's 1993 conviction. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-50 (Law Co-op. 1996 Supp.).
" Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *25; see also Stone, supra note 5.
2 Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *9; see also Stone, supra note 5.
" Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *9; see also Joseph Wharton, Drugs in
Pregnancy Amount to Abuse, 82 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 43 (stating that Whitner
court's reasoning was based mainly on existing medical knowledge instead of on re-
lationship between mother and child).
14 See infra notes 54-58; See generally Joseph J. Volpe, M.D., Effect of Cocaine
Use on the Fetus, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 666 (1985).
"' Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *10.
16 Id.
7 A precedent case in the area of fetal rights was Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d
497 (N.J. 1960), which declared that a child had the right to be protected in utero
from negligence or harm. This court, however, only intended liability to extend to
third parties. CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE 12 (1993). The most diffi-
cult cases arise when the mother, not a third party, has injured the fetus because
the courts must balance the privacy interests of women and the state's interest in
protecting life. Tony Mauro, Rights of the Unborn Abortion Battle, Medical Gains
Cloud Legal Landscape, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 1996, at 1A. Today, it is recognized
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tiquated notion, however, to achieve justice for the woman's
neglected newborn. Accordingly, the court concluded that
Cornelia Whitner was guilty of criminal child neglect. 8
While the use of certain drugs by any person has been
criminally actionable throughout the twentieth century,9
accountability for such illicit substances' effects on one's
child treads a historically less traveled path but elevates
the status of the child inside the womb to that of a child
outside the womb. Whitner was a "landmark decision for
protecting children,""° in which the South Carolina Supreme
Court became the first state high court in the nation to up-
hold a conviction of a mother for endangering the life of her
fetus through her prenatal conduct.' Jurisdictions are split
regarding the issue of whether viable fetuses are persons
entitled to legal protection under child abuse statutes. The
critical inquiry has been the status of fetal rights, specifi-
cally in relation to the rights of the mother." Criminal
that a woman who injures her own viable fetus should receive the same penalty as a
third party inflicting the same damage and that legislative bills must not exempt
the mother from liability. See Philip C. Thornberg, Letter to the Editor, Woman
Abusing Fetus Ought to be Penalized, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 11, 1996, at 13A
(writing in response to Ohio "feticide" legislation, Senate Bill 239, which allows
prosecution of third parties but exempts abusive behavior by mothers).
18 Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *25.
"KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN: DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 22 (1994).
20 Abuse of Viable Fetus Ruled a Crime, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at A8 (quoting
South Carolina State Attorney General, Charlie Condon).
21 Stone, supra note 5. Stone explains that, in recent years, prosecutions for a
mother's prenatal conduct have become more common but most appellate courts
have dismissed such charges. Id. Criminal charges are usually brought under stat-
utes prohibiting child abuse or distribution of drugs to a minor. Id. Stone states that
only four other high courts in the nation have considered this question (Nevada,
Florida, Kentucky, and Ohio) and all have ruled against criminalizing maternal
conduct before the birth of a child. Id. A total of 200 women in 30 different states
have been prosecuted for such prenatal conduct but only Cornelia Whitner's convic-
tion has been upheld..Kaufus, supra note 7, at B7. Despite strong opposition, the
South Carolina Supreme Court believed case law and the plain language of the child
neglect statute supported its landmark decision. See Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120,
at *9 (holding plain meaning of "person" as set forth in prior decisions includes vi-
able fetus).
22 See generally DANIELS, supra note 17, at 3-4 (describing fetus "as the newest
'social actor' in the American conservative imagination"); Robin Blumner, Drunk Fe-
tus Cases Endanger Abortion Choice, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 22, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 11293503 (analyzing impact of extension of fetal rights on
abortion debate). The debate over the existence of fetal rights involves questions
about the maternal-fetal relationship, moral obligations owed to the fetus, and a
pregnant woman's right to privacy. See DANIELS, supra note 17, at 3-7; BONNIE
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courts have struggled with the question of whether the fe-
tus should be considered an independent legal entity or
simply an appendage of its mother.'
Part One of this Comment traces the evolution of a fe-
tus' legal status throughout history, focusing on the devel-
opment in South Carolina's jurisprudence. Part Two as-
serts that viability is the birthplace of fetal rights. Part
Three posits that a woman's freedom of choice concerning
abortion is preserved and can exist alongside fetal rights
under the Whitner analysis. Part Four establishes limits on
the extent of a pregnant mother's criminal liability, confin-
ing liability to illegal activities undertaken during preg-
nancy. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that child
abuse protection must be extended to all viable "persons"
whether their physical locations are inside or outside of the
womb.
I. WHITNER MARKS NEXT STAGE IN EVOLUTION OF FETAL
RIGHTS
Historically, birth, when the child became physically
separate from its mother, was the origin of legal rights.'
Over time, however, courts began recognizing that legal
rights precede one's debut into the external environment.
Nineteenth-century property law concerning inheritance
marked the earliest recognition of fetal rights. Under such
law, a fetus existing at the time of the testator's death was
entitled to receive an inheritance.' The fetus was granted
the status of a person for this limited purpose, provided
that the fetus was born alive.26
STEINBECK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH 128-163 (1992) (concerning maternal-fetal conflict).
2 See VALERIE GREEN, DOPED UP, KNOCKED UP, AND ... LOCKED UP? 37-60
(1993) (tracing trend extending criminal laws to protect fetus); see also Blumner,
supra note 22 (citing examples from Florida, South Carolina, and Wisconsin where
states determined that criminal and civil laws applied to viable fetus).
24 See Patricia A. Sexton, Imposing Criminal Sanctions on Pregnant Drug Users:
Throwing the Baby Out With the Bath Water, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 410, 414 (1993)
("Historically, the legal system treated the fetus as part of the woman.").
25 See, e.g., Cowles v. Cowles, 13 A. 414, 417 (Conn. 1887) (holding that child will
be considered "in being" from conception when it benefits child). The right of inheri-
tance vested with the fetus in recognition of parent's presumed desire to provide for
children conceived but not yet born at the time of their death. See Christian v. Car-
ter, 137 S.E. 596, 597 (N.C. 1927).
26 See Medlock v. Brown, 136 S.E. 551, 553 (Ga. 1927) ("A child en ventre sa
mere, after it becomes quick, is to be regarded as a child in esse, or a child then liv-
1997]
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Tort law was the next legal arena to afford rights to the
fetus. After the 1946 decision in Bonbrest v. Kotz,"7 fetuses
gained the right to recover for tortious injuries inflicted
upon them in utero.8 The Bonbrest decision marked a ma-
jor advance in the development of fetal rights; the fetus was
no longer merely afforded protection from the opportunistic
conduct of others but it was also given standing to seek re-
dress for its injuries in court. 9
While case law continued to expand notions of fetal
rights in the civil law context, criminal statutes have not
displayed the same flexibility." A fetus was first declared a
person for purposes of criminal liability in the landmark
decision Commonwealth v. Cass.3 In Cass, the Massachu-
setts court concluded that a fetus, who died as a result of a
car accident, constituted a "person" within the meaning of
the state's vehicular homicide statute." This pronounce-
ment afforded fetuses relief in the criminal realm as well as
the civil one.
While individual states have struggled with the issue of
whether a fetus is a "person" under the criminal law,
courts such as Cass and Whitner represent the gradual
erosion of narrowly construed and outdated criminal stat-
utes and seek to include fetal rights within the scope of
such criminal laws.33
ing.').
27 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
28 Id. at 142 (allowing recovery when child was injured through professional
malpractice during delivery). "The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to
those who by their wrongful act ... have invaded the right of an individual ... in
their professional capacities." Id. While the Bonbrest decision did establish fetal
rights under tort law, the court maintained that a fetus did not receive separate
recognition until it passed the point of viability. DANIELS, supra note 17, at 11. Fur-
thermore, the court held that such rights were not conferred until the fetus was
born alive. Id.
29 See James Andrew Freeman, Comment, Prenatal Substance Abuse: Texas,
Texans and Future Texans Can't Afford It, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 567-68 (1996)
(noting that court recognized fetus as separate legal entity having right of action).
3' Many states follow the Model Penal Code which defines a "human being" as "a
person who has been born and is alive." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0 (1) (1985).
21 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984).
22 Id. at 1325, 1329.
'3 While Cass, Whitner, and other recent cases represent judicial activism on
behalf of the expansion of fetal rights under criminal law, a number of state legisla-
tures have also adopted new criminal statutes expressly imposing liability for fetal
harms. See Sexton, supra note 24, at 415.
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South Carolina's legal protection of viable fetuses as
persons holding certain legal rights and privileges began in
the 1960's when the state Supreme Court first declared that
a fetus was a person for the purposes of civil actions under
the state's wrongful death statute.34 Several years later,
South Carolina extended protection to viable fetuses in the
criminal context by recognizing that homicide laws afford
protection to the unborn child in State v. Home."
In Home, the defendant stabbed his wife in the abdo-
men when she was nine months pregnant." He was
charged and convicted of assault and battery and voluntary
manslaughter in connection with the stabbing of his wife
and the resulting death of the full-term viable fetus.37 The
South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously held that a vi-
able fetus was a "person" within the meaning of the state's
murder statute.38 Through the application of tort-based fe-
tal rights in this criminal context, as well as the finding of
fetuses as persons in the civil realm, the court laid the
groundwork for the state's further extension of fetal rights
in Whitner.
Several other states have joined the fetal rights move-
ment, supporting South Carolina's belief that the fetus is
an independent legal entity entitled to protection under
criminal statutes.39 Other states, however, have held that a
3 See Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 (S.C. 1964) (determining that vi-
able fetus need not be born alive because administrator can maintain action for
wrongful death of fetus). The Fowler court said that a viable child constituted a
"person" even before it left the womb. Id. at 43; see also Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d
790, 793 (S.C. 1960) (holding that fetus capable of life apart from its mother is per-
son).
:" 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) ("From the date of this decision henceforth,
the law of feticide shall apply in this state.").
so Id.
37 Id.
"" Id. at 704. "It would be grossly inconsistent for us to construe a viable fetus as
a 'person' for the purposes of imposing civil liability while refusing to give it a simi-
lar classification in the criminal context." Id. Despite its holding that a fetus would
be considered a person, the Home court reversed defendant's conviction for volun-
tary manslaughter based on the absence of such criminal law at the time of defen-
dant's action. Id. The court firmly held, however, that the law of feticide would ap-
ply henceforth in South Carolina. Id.
39 See Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984); Mone v. Su-
perior Judicial Ct. of Mass., 331 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 1975) (holding that viable
fetus was "person" under state wrongful death statute); State v. Knapp, No. WD
44098, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 1883 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1991) (declaring that fetus
19971
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fetus is not a "person" within their criminal statutes." Op-
ponents argue for strict construction of child abuse statutes
asserting that a fetus is fundamentally different from a
child and, therefore, a statute must have a specific refer-
ence to the protection of "fetuses" for it to apply to the un-
born.4 ' The Whitner court, however, believed that an ex-
is "person" under involuntary manslaughter statute); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935,
939 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1986) (stating that fetus was "abused child" when mother used
heroin dangerously close to child's birth); Hughes v. State, 868 P.2d 730, 734 (Okla.
Ct. Crim. App. 1994) (stating that "[a] viable human fetus is nothing less than hu-
man life").
Since fetal rights are established in civil law allowing unborns to inherit and in
criminal law allowing third parties to be prosecuted for harming a fetus, holding
mothers accountable for harming a fetus is a logical extension of this evolution. Jean
Davidson, Pregnant Addicts Drug Babies Push Issue of Fetal Rights, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1989, at 1.
'0 "Nearly half the states still don't recognize the killing of a fetus as murder
unless the child is born alive and then dies." Mauro, supra note 17, at 1A This illus-
trates the traditional "born alive" rule. Historically, many homicide statutes did not
cover feticide cases. See State v. McCall, 458 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984)
(declaring that individual cannot be convicted of murder or manslaughter of viable
fetus); Billingsley v. State, 360 S.E.2d 451, 452 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
"person" does not include fetus within vehicular homicide statute); State v. Trudell,
755 P.2d 511, 517 (Kan. 1988) (holding that "person" does not include fetus within
vehicular homicide statute); State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799, 802 (La. 1975) (refusing
to include fetus as "person" under murder statute); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1, 4
(N.C. 1989) (refusing to include fetus as "person" under murder statute).
41 See Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *30 (Finney, C.J., and Moore, A.J., dis-
senting) (stating that "it is for the General Assembly, and not this court" to crimi-
nalize such conduct and craft legislation to specifically target fetuses); see also Vo v.
Superior Ct. of Ariz., 836 P.2d 408, 419 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to extend
common law rule that viable fetus can recover in wrongful death action to justify
including feticide under murder statute). The Vo court believed that common law
authority was not sufficient; only the legislature could define criminal penalties. Id.;
see also Carlson, supra note 5, at A9 (discussing dismissal of criminal case where
pregnant woman used cocaine and heroin and stating that "if Washington state leg-
islators wanted viable fetuses protected by child abuse laws they should've written
that protection specifically into the statute"). In a criminal context, courts tread
very carefully because an individual's liberty and constitutional rights are at stake.
See, e.g., McCall, 458 So. 2d at 877 (citations omitted) ("Penal statutes must be
strictly construed. In most circumstances, substantive changes in long-standing
common law rules are best left to the legislature."); see also Timothy Lynch, At Is-
sue: Is the Prosecution of 'Fetal Endangerment' Legitimate?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at
72 (arguing that prosecutorial and judicial lawmaking infringes upon constitutional
rights); see Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisprudential In-
consistencies in Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP.
L. REV. 933, 952 (1995).
As a consequence, there are often inconsistencies in court decisions; a court
may deem a viable fetus a "person" within the civil context but not within the crimi-
nal context. Id. at 959. The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, determined that a
viable fetus was a person under the wrongful death statute, but not under the mur-
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pansive interpretation of "person" to include fetuses was
necessary to appropriately effectuate the legislature's in-
tent.42 Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect legislatures to
change laws to specifically include fetuses, especially in an
area as controversial as that of reproductive rights.43 Until
legislators consider such fetal rights issues, it is the role of
prosecutors to test the limits of state criminal statutes." A
rigid construction of such statutes denies a court the flexi-
der statute. Compare Summerfield v. Superior Ct., 698 P.2d 712, 724 (Ariz. 1985),
with Vo, 836 P.2d at 419 (explaining that Arizona became code state and thus court
did not have power to expand criminal law through changing common law principles
as in Summerfleld). North Carolina has exhibited the same inconsistency. Compare
Beale, 376 S.E.2d at 4 (holding fetus was not "person" under murder statute), with
DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 495 (N.C. 1987) (stating that viable fetus was
"person" under wrongful death statute). To ensure fairness, there must be uniform-
ity of interpretation among the courts.
42 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The intent of the legislature is of-
ten determinative in a court's ruling. See, e.g., California v. Stewart, No. M508197,
slip. op. at 1-11 (Cal. Mun. Ct. 1987) (stating that intent of child abuse statute was
to ensure financial support of children by their fathers).
4 See Mauro, supra note 17, at 1A. Opponents fear that "expansion of fetal
rights may deny fundamental right of reproduction to a particular class of sick
women [drug addicts] whose symptoms [compulsive drug use] may injure their fe-
tuses." Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug Exposed Babies:
Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 520 (1990). McGinnis
argues that pregnant women with cancer require drugs that harm fetuses and such
right to procreate must extend to drug users. Id. The distinct difference, however, is
that cancer drugs are legal and serve a valuable societal purpose, unlike the drug
cocaine. Therefore, distinctions should be made so that a pregnant woman indulging
in otherwise legal activities, such as smoking, drinking alcohol, or taking prescrip-
tion drugs, would not be subject to criminal liability for any potential harms such
legal acts cause to the fetus. But see, e.g., Drunken Fetus Charges Stay, NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 30, 1996, at A8 (highlighting pending Wisconsin case of People v. Zimmerman
where mother was charged with intentional homicide and reckless conduct after
giving birth to child with blood-alcohol content of 0.199%).
" But see McGinnis, supra note 43, at 513 (asserting that legislatures, not
courts, must define criminal offenses because it is unconstitutional to ignore legis-
lative intent and create new crimes). To date, no state has specifically criminalized a
mother's prenatal drug use. As a result, prosecutors must "creatively manipulate
statutes that do not expressly address the issue in order to charge mothers whose
drug addiction harms the fetus." Lisa M. Noller, Taking Care of Two: Criminalizing
the Ingestion of Controlled Substances During Pregnancy, 2 U. CHI. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 367, 376 (1995). The result is inconsistent precedents on which to rely.
Prosecutors try to "find" or "manufacture" liability and women may claim lack of
notice because the statutes do not clearly proscribe their ingestion of drugs while
pregnant. Id. Punishment under such a system is too discretionary and based on the
subjective and discriminatory leanings of public officials rather than firm statutory
language. Louise Marlane Chan, S.O.S. from the Womb: A Call for New York Legis-
lation Criminalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199, 213
(1993).
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bility to modify traditional rules in order to accommodate
the changing times.45 While a statute well crafted by the
legislature would be the ideal solution, viable fetuses may
only have the judiciary on which to rely for protection.
Justice demands judicial activism in this area.
A corollary to a fetus' legal standing as a "person" in the
criminal law is the implication on the mother's legal rights.
Opponents argue that maternal conduct before the birth of
a child does not give rise to criminal responsibility. 6 Since
no statute specifically proscribes maternal drug use, states
have attempted to prosecute such cases under many differ-
ent statutes, including those for child abuse and neglect,
drug delivery and distribution to minors, involuntary man-
slaughter, and pure drug use. 7
South Carolina's historic decision resurrected the bal-
ancing of a woman's rights with those of her fetus. With
the advance of technology, there has been increasing sup-
port for a fetus' legal rights.48 By necessity, however, ex-
'5 See K. Christopher Shen, The Lack of a Judicial Policy Addressing Maternal
Substance Abuse Cases: Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993), 17
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 929, 937 (1994).
46 Critics of Whitner have extensive case law to support their position. See John-
son v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296 (Fla. 1992) (reversing mother's conviction for
child abuse for ingesting cocaine while pregnant); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140,
1140 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that introduction of cocaine into woman's own
body did not amount to child abuse); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 283
(Ky. 1993) (holding that drug abuse by mother when she injected oxycodone into her
jugular vein while pregnant cannot be included within criminal child abuse statute).
The Welch court drew a distinction between protecting a child from abuse and from
death when it stated that "common law intended definition of 'person' to vary de-
pending on [the] type of crime committed." Shen, supra note 45, at 935. The differ-
ence is that criminal child abuse, unlike homicide, is not a common law crime; so,
legislative intent (not common law) is binding and demands that the court not apply
such statutes to prenatal injuries inflicted by the mother. Welch, 864 S.W.2d at 282-
83. The Welch analysis incorrectly focused on the particular consequences and not
the act itself.
4 See Shona B. Glink, The Prosecution of Maternal Fetal Abuse: Is This the An-
swer?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 546 (1991).
48 Sheilah Martin & Murray Coleman, Judicial Intervention in Pregnancy, 40
MCGILL L.J. 947 (1995) (relating both sides of struggle for superiority of interests
between mother and child). Additionally, with a growing number of infants injured
by prenatal drug addiction each year, both sides agree that prosecutions based on
old laws will increase. Jean Davidson, Newborn Drug Exposure Conviction a Drastic
First, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 1989, at 1 (reporting on Johnson v. State, first U.S. con-
viction of pregnant woman who gave birth to drug exposed newborn in Florida (later
reversed by Florida Supreme Court) on "delivery" theory that woman passed drugs
to infant in one minute time period between birth and cutting of umbilical cord). "As
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tensions of fetal rights compromise the freedoms of preg-
nant women.4 9
Past recognition of the legal rights of unborn viable fe-
tuses in South Carolina has facilitated the court's extension
of fetal protection from wrongful death and murder statutes
to this criminal child neglect statute. Whitner establishes a
significant turning point in the direction of greater fetal
rights and serves as a model to which courts may look in
justifying future convictions."
many as 15% of all pregnant women ingest illegal drugs during their pregnancies."
Margaret P. Spencer, Prosecutorial Immunity: The Response to Prenatal Drug Use,
25 CONN. L. REV. 393, 393 (1993). Recognition of fetal rights simply illustrates that
the law is keeping pace with medical science; the evolving protections afforded the
unborn have paralleled scientific knowledge about the fetus. Scot Lehigh, Court
Cases Pit Fetus' Rights Against Abortion Rights, The Issue: When Does it Become a
Living Person?, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 22, 1996, at 31A.
Birth was formerly the dividing line between rights recognized by the law and
those not recognized. See Mauro, supra note 17, at 1A. With advances in technology,
however, legally recognized life begins inside the mother's womb at some point be-
tween conception and birth. Id. Fetal monitoring and surgery, even fetal autopsies,
have given prosecutors the tools they need to prove the elements of a crime. Id. It is
possible to see that the fetus was alive and healthy when the injuries from drug in-
gestion took place; in comparison, under the early common law standards, it was
difficult to tell if a woman was even pregnant and more difficult to tell if the child
was healthy. Id.
49 Mauro, supra note 17, at 1A. "A woman's freedom to control her body is cir-
cumscribed by the obligation she incurs to her fetus." DANIELS, supra note 17, at 25.
"A pregnant woman represents the interdependence of life." Id. at 139. But see Mar-
garet Phillips, Umbilical Cords: The New Drug Connection, 40 BuFF. L. REV. 525,
527, 553 (1992) (arguing that prosecuting pregnant drug addicts is merely mecha-
nism to subjugate women and that their biological connection to fetuses subjects
their actions to far greater punishment than actions of men).
Phillips claims that the criminal prosecution of pregnant addicts will reinforce
the gender hierarchy in which women do not have their own identity but rather, are
viewed in relation to their fetuses. Id. at 557. Prosecutors, she argues, are just in-
venting crimes of which only women can be guilty. Id. at 562. This argument raises
a possible Equal Protection question. The Whitner prosecution, however, survives
the equal protection challenge. Because women are found in both the deprived class
(drug abusing women) and the class receiving benefits (all other pregnant women),
the law does not discriminate based on gender. James Denison, The Efficacy and
Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment for Maternal Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1103, 1133 (1991). Even if the law was gender specific, it would pass the
applicable constitutional test, intermediate scrutiny, because protecting fetuses
from drug addiction serves an important state interest. Id.; cf Michael M. v. Supe-
rior Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1987) (upholding statutory rape law which held only men
liable in interests of preventing teen pregnancy).
' The landmark decision in Whitner will have an effect on pending cases involv-
ing a mother's substance abuse that has injured her fetus.
In Wisconsin, a state appeals court, in State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki,
541 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), stated that a pregnant woman's rights were
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II. VIABILITY: THE BIRTHPLACE OF FETAL RIGHTS
The viability stage, defined as the time when the fetus
can live apart from its mother, has been designated as the
"birth" of fetal rights entitled to constitutional protection.51
The court, in Bonbrest v. Kotz,52 declared that viability was
the decisive factor in determining when protection from
various harms begins. 3 It is submitted that the devastat-
ing physiological effects of cocaine54 upon the viable fetus
not violated by a "protective custody" order, which detained her for three weeks in a
drug treatment center, because only the fetus was ordered detained. Denniston, su-
pra note 4, at 1A. In this case, the court construed the child welfare statute to in-
clude "fetus" within statutory definition of "child" and issued the order for the viable
fetus, citing Roe's holding that the state's interest in potential life becomes compel-
ling at viability. This was the first appellate court in the nation to make such a rul-
ing, evidencing the march toward greater fetal rights. See A. Michael Lee, State ex.
rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki: the Wisconsin Court of Appeals Introduces a Danger-
ous New Weapon in Battle over "Fetal Rights," 30 GA. L. REV. 1183 (1996). This case
has been appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the issue of the constitu-
tionality of such state detention. Even though the custody order was for the fetus,
the mother, being physically attached to the fetus, was also detained. Cary Segall,
Court to Hear Case of Woman Held to Protect Fetus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
Will Decide Whether the State Had the Right to Detain a Waukesha Woman Who
Used Drugs While Pregnant, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 27, 1996, at 1A.
Another case is that of Kawana Ashley, a 19-year old girl in Florida who shot
herself in the stomach resulting in the death of her infant. Florida: Manslaughter
Trial Goes before State Supreme Court, AM. POL. NETWORK, Nov. 7, 1996. The in-
fant died of organ failure after an emergency cesarean section after the gunshot
wound. Id. Ashley was originally charged with third-degree felony murder and
manslaughter, but the courts dismissed the manslaughter charge. Id. Both sides
have appealed to the Florida Supreme Court. Id.
The timing of the Whitner decision was critical; as the first state high court to
criminalize maternal drug use, it sent a prominent message that abuse to the un-
born child will not be tolerated.
51 Viability is "that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child
may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life suppor-
tive systems." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1565 (6th ed. 1990); see, e.g., Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (declaring that women have constitutional right to abortion
under Fourteenth Amendment up to point of fetus' viability after which time state
has compelling interest in life of fetus); see also DANIELS, supra note 17, at 17-18. In
the medical community, the third trimester fetus is called the "unborn patient" upon
whom surgical and therapeutic procedures can be performed. KEITH L. MOORE &
TVN PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN 105 (1993). On a practical level, viability is
a workable demarcation because it is often difficult to prove causation in early
stages of pregnancy. See Kaufus, supra note 7, at B7.
52 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
Id. at 140; cf Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (1953) (stating that le-
gal entity begins at conception and can recover for tortious injury occurring anytime
after then). The Kelly court posited that viability is immaterial and focus should be
solely on child's survival after birth. Id.
' Cocaine is one of the most commonly used drugs among women of childbear-
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qualify as child abuse.55 Civil statutes have already ac-
knowledged this reality.56 Child abuse does have criminal
sanctions; if child abuse includes drug dependent children,
as specifically enumerated in the civil law, then such crimi-
nal sanctions should also be imposed upon mothers.
ing age. Dr. Claudia A. Chiriboga, Fetal Effects, 11 NEUROLOGIC CLINICS 3, 707-22
(Aug. 1993). It is a teratogen, an "agent that can produce a congenital anomaly or
raise the incidence of an anomaly in the population." MOORE & PERSUAD, supra note
51, at 153. Crack is an alkaline form of cocaine that can be 95% pure. Zeev N. Kain,
et al., Cocaine Abuse in the Parturient and Effects on the Fetus and Neonate, 77
ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 4, 835-42 (Oct. 1993). It is a relatively inexpensive drug
and a "hit" takes under one minute and lasts five to ten minutes. Id. The drug then
enters the fetus' system where it is converted into the more potent substance, nar-
cocaine. Julie J. Zitella, Protecting our Children: A Call to Reform State Policies to
Hold Pregnant Drug Addicts Accountable, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 765, 767 (1996).
The fetus experiences a "rush" when the drug is transferred by enzymes through the
umbilical cord. Freeman, supra note 29, at 546. The drug is not immediately recircu-
lated to the mother's bloodstream; it is absorbed in the fetal tissue where its deadly
effects are compounded. Id. After birth, the child actually suffers physical with-
drawal from the drug and its brain "never forgets cocaine," increasing the likelihood
that the child will become an addict in later life. Id. at 550. The effects of cocaine
follow a child through his/her early development as well. Physically, infants exposed
to cocaine while in the womb may have deformities; physiologically, they may have
different organizational responses and different interactive behavior. Chiriboga, su-
pra, at 716-17. They often experience difficulty feeding and sleeping. Id. "[C]ocaine
affects the excitability and central pathways of the developing brain, especially of
the brain stem." Id. at 718. Women who use cocaine are more likely to give birth
prematurely, thereby increasing the chances that the child will suffer respiratory
and developmental problems. Davidson, supra note 39, at 1. Even if these babies are
carried to full term, there is still a greater risk of physical and neurological defects.
Id. They are also more prone to sudden infant death syndrome. Id.
0 "[Wihen a mother feeds her fetus crack cocaine through its umbilical cord just
hours before it is born, and it is born as a crack addicted child, it is clearly an
abused child." Thornberg, supra note 17, at 13A. A woman does not have the right to
"inflict a lifetime of suffering on her future child, simply in order to satisfy a mo-
mentary whim for a quick fix .... [The] right to abuse [her] own body stops at the
border of [her] womb." DANIELS, supra note 17, at 26. (quoting Alan Dershowitz).
"We must now have a presumption that a child [born with drugs in his or her sys-
tem] is the victim of abuse." Alex Adwan, Coke Babies and Their Mothers, TULSA
WORLD, Jan. 21, 1996, at G1 (quoting New York City Mayor Rudolph Guiliani, re-
garding proposal making it easier to take crack addicted babies away from their
drug addicted mothers). In New York, as Oklahoma, the law does not specifically
include drug exposure to a fetus as child abuse. Id. Oklahoma, however, does allow
the state to take custody, an alternative to prosecution of the mother, when it is for
the safety of the newborn. Id.
E Some states have enacted civil laws that clearly define prenatal drug use as
evidence of child abuse or neglect. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (West 1995)
(stating that "prenatal exposure to a controlled substance" constitutes "neglect");
NEV. REV. STAT. § 432.330(1)(b) (1991) (declaring that drug addicted child is in need
of protection); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7001-1.34(a)(3) (1995) (stating that child born
drug dependent is "deprived" and in need of treatment).
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The fetus sustains varying degrees of damage, depend-
ing upon the extent of the mother's drug use.17 Critics of fe-
tal rights claim that most of this damage takes place during
the early stages of pregnancy when the fetus is developing
its organ systems." Insulating mothers from liability dur-
ing this pre-viability period, they posit, fails to prevent the
fetal harm. 9 This simplistic view of fetal development,
however, ignores the continuing biological development and
tremendous growth that takes place in the third trimester,
after the point of viability. For example, beginning in the
sixth month of pregnancy there is substantial weight gain. 0
The fetus accumulates a store of fat, up to fourteen grams a
V A medical analysis reinforces viability as the origin of a mother's liability.
Studies indicate that the timing of the cocaine ingestion is important. See Kain, et
al., supra note 54, at 835-42. Cocaine ingestion during later stages of pregnancy
causes lower birth weight and retarded intrauterine growth. Id. at 840. One study
found that exposure to cocaine in the first trimester had no effect. Id. The pattern of
cocaine use - the frequency as well as the timing - is critical in assessing the danger
to the fetus. D.W. Rurak, Fetal Behavioral States: Pathological Alterations with
Drug/Alcohol Abuse, 16 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY 4, 239-51 (Aug. 1992). A child
has time to recover if cocaine is taken in early pregnancy but severe, permanent
damage is often done after the point of viability. Third trimester cocaine use may
cause immediate contractions, heightened fetal activity, and premature labor. Kain,
et al., supra note 54, at 838. A dangerous consequence can be abruptio placentae,
"the vasoconstrictive effect of cocaine caus[ing disruption in placental adherence to
the uterine wall." Id. This condition could be fatal for both mother and child. Id. In
addition, there is a greater chance of a fetal stroke resulting from an intracranial
hemorrhage from late cocaine use; this is evidenced by findings that newborns had
increased cerebral blood flow from "recent cocaine exposure." Chiriboga, supra note
54, at 717.
8 See Denison, supra note 49, at 1112; Glink, supra note 47, at 564 (claiming
that fetus is most susceptible to harm by drug use during first trimester); Kristen
Rachelle Lichtenberg, Gestational Substance Abuse: A Call for a Thoughtful Legisla-
tive Response, 65 WASH. L. REV. 377, 380 (1990) (asserting that majority of fetal
damage from cocaine use occurs during first trimester and cannot be reversed by
ceasing to use drug). The author explains that urogenital malformations are also
associated with first trimester drug usage. Id. at 379 n.25.
59 Critics argue that a "maternal duty model," allowing for state intervention in
the first trimester would be most sensible, because this is when most of the damage
to the fetus occurs. Lichtenberg, supra note 58, at 389. It is conceded, however, that
a policy of prosecuting a woman for acts which harm her fetus but allowing her to
end her pregnancy at the same stage would clash with Roe v. Wade. Id. A conflict
arises when abortion law overlaps with child abuse law.
60 MOORE & PERSUAD, supra note 51, at 96. Because of the rapid growth during
this time, fetal demands for proper and sufficient nutrition are enormous. MOFFETT,
ET AL., supra note 1, at 738. Doctors advise pregnant women to consume an exces-
sive amount of calories during the first trimester to have a supply for this growth
spurt. Id.
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day in the last weeks of gestation, that is critical to survival
after delivery.6' Additionally, this period is vital for proper
organ development that continues throughout pregnancy,
such as the development of the fetal brain and nervous sys-
tem." Furthermore, in the later stages of gestation, the fe-
tus builds up the necessary tissue and prepares its organ
systems to facilitate the transition from the inside of the
mother's womb to the outside environment.'
The period after viability is a critical stage during
which serious damage may be prevented. Thus, state in-
tervention after viability would prevent substantial harm to
the fetus and long term effects upon the child.' Cocaine's
long-term effects, including fine and gross motor skill delay
and retarded physiological maturity,' are no less brutal
than the effects of starving or beating a child. Child abuse
must not be distinguished based upon when or where it
takes place; it is the nature and effects of the abusive
treatment that must be examined when assessing criminal
6' Fat develops rapidly during the last six to eight weeks of development, giving
the fetus a smooth, plump appearance which transforms the wrinkled form charac-
teristic of early gestation. MOORE & PERSUAD, supra note 51, at 109. Low birth-
weight is the classic result of cocaine use. See Kain, et al., supra note 54, at 840.
6 MOFFETT, ET AL., supra note 1, at 738. "The development of each individual
organ system can be thought of as a thread that is woven together with other
threads to generate an organism that, as development goes forward, is increasingly
capable of independent life." Id. at 736. The sixth month also marks the beginning of
rapid eye movements and blink startle responses by the fetus. MOORE & PERSUAD,
supra note 51, at 96. The fetal nervous system develops continuously throughout
gestation and is not complete even at birth. MOFFETT, ET. AL., supra note 1, at 738.
Substance abuse by pregnant women, therefore, can have a devastating effect on the
fetus' nervous system at any time during pregnancy. Id. In addition, while the brain
endures its most intensive development in the first 3-16 weeks, it continues to de-
velop throughout pregnancy and the first two years after birth. MOORE & PERSUAD,
supra note 51, at 154.
6 MOORE & PERSUAD, supra note 51, at 109.
c See, e.g., Glink, supra note 47, at 572 (explaining that "[bly criminalizing ille-
gal substance abuse during pregnancy, society would seek to prevent the resulting
injury that such conduct inflicts on the fetus and to place a value on society's inter-
est in condemning maternal substance abuse").
C5 See supra notes 54-58. These children also become a great economic burden
on society. When drug addicted children are separated into special classrooms, it
costs approximately $15,000 a year to educate them compared to about $3,500 a
year for a normal child. Thornberg, supra note 17, at 13A. Cocaine causes children
to be rowdy, disorganized, and violent in school and also affects language production
and comprehension, necessitating the separation. Zitella, supra note 54, at 768.
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liability. The child's physical location is irrelevant." A
mother must not evade responsibility for abusing her child
at the child's most vulnerable stage, its fetal stage.
III. ABORTION RIGHTS SURVIVE
Opponents seek an answer to a seemingly illogical im-
plication of Whitner: if abortion, the killing of a fetus, is le-
gal, then how can abusing or neglecting a fetus be illegal?'
The fear is that Whitner's extension of fetal rights will en-
danger the abortion rights guaranteed to women under Roe
v. Wade.6" Critics of fetal rights believe that fetuses are not
children in need of protection and that a mother's conduct
before the birth of her child is protected under a constitu-
" Mary E. Roper, Reaching the Babies Through the Mothers: The Effects of
Prosecution on Pregnant Substance Abusers, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 171, 220
(1992); see, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457,
458 (Ga. 1981) (declaring that viable fetus survival rights must be placed ahead of
mother's privacy rights). This reflects the "parent-child" test which asks whether
the conduct of pregnant women would be "wanton" in the context of parent and child
instead of mothei and fetus; if the conduct fails to meet this test, it is not punish-
able. Shen, supra note 45, at 940. It is asserted that, ultimately, there is no differ-
ence between transferring cocaine via the umbilical cord and injecting a young child
with cocaine. But see Michael A. Shekey, Note and Comment, Criminal Liability of a
Prospective Mother for Prenatal Neglect of a Viable Fetus, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 363,
388 n.220-21 (1987) (positing "geography" argument: mother and fetus are social
unit and, while baby is in womb, mother cannot be prosecuted for actions that harm
fetus). The author posits that pregnant mothers are held to a lower standard than
parents of children already born. Id. at 363 n.1 (citing California v. Stewart, No.
M508197 (San Diego Mun. Ct. 1987))(stating that pregnant women cannot be
equated with parents of children). Just moments, however, separate the two sta-
tuses and the liability line must be drawn at viability. Child abuse law ought to con-
form to other systems of law where the line is drawn at viability, a marker that has
both logical and biological justifications. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
67 See Blumner, supra note 22. Opponents to maternal criminalization for drug
use during pregnancy claim that part of the pro-life agenda is to put the fetus on an
equal plane with its mother. Lehigh, supra note 48, at 31k Abortion foes, however,
are also opposed to such criminalization for the very reason that it will give women
greater incentive to have an abortion. See Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *33
(Finney, C.J., and Moore, A.J., dissenting) (stating that, from a liability standpoint,
woman would be better off illegally aborting third trimester fetus and facing two-
year sentence rather than giving birth to baby after ingesting cocaine and facing 10-
year sentence).
68 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Before 1973, courts seemed willing to grant protection to
the viable fetus. See GREEN, supra note 23, at 8. Courts also made clear, however,
that an unviable fetus could never achieve rights greater than the mother's right to
privacy. Id. A pregnant woman can even have an abortion in the third trimester if it
is performed to save her life. Id. at 12; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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tional right to privacy.69 They argue further that drug ad-
diction during pregnancy is a health problem, not a legal
one.
70
Whitner is consistent with Roe v. Wade and its progeny.
Both areas of law, fetal and reproductive rights, address the
interests of women, fetuses, and the State. The constitu-
tional right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes a woman's right to have
an abortion.71 This right is not absolute, however, and the
State may infringe upon it in the interests of safeguarding
health and protecting potential life. When state interests
are triggered, an abortion is no longer available to a
" See, e.g., Kaufus, supra note 7, at B7 (stating that, in California, criminal
laws do not protect fetuses and women are generally not prosecuted for taking
drugs while pregnant); see also Davidson, supra note 39, at 1 (noting that, although
great number of children are taken into custody in California because of abuse or
neglect due to mothers' drug ingestion, state has not further criminalized taking
drugs while pregnant because fetus is not legally recognized as person). But see
Glink, supra note 47, at 568 (asserting that statute prosecuting maternal drug use
would be justifiable because drug dependent babies are serious problem and crimi-
nalizing already illegal conduct is minimal intrusion upon woman's right to privacy).
'0 Roper, supra note 66, at 187; Kaufus, supra note 7, at B7.
7'1 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. "A fundamental right to privacy protects a decision to
abort, but not a decision to abuse drugs or alcohol." Lichtenberg, supra note 58, at
388. Abortion rights have evolved through the Roe line of cases. The Roe Court
stated that a fetus was not a "person." While the Court would not explicitly address
the issue of when life begins, it indirectly determined that life begins at viability.
See Klasing, supra note 41, at 966. After the point of viability, the state can inter-
vene and regulate abortion. Id. at 967. Abortion was declared a fundamental right
requiring "strict scrutiny" to infringe upon it. Id. at 966-70. "Strict scrutiny" de-
mands a "compelling state interest" to regulate an activity, and this regulation must
be "closely tailored" to achieve that interest through the least restrictive means
possible. Id. The term "viability" came alive in the legal field following the Roe deci-
sion. Id. The line of viability was moved back from 28 weeks to 20 weeks in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 515-16 (1989), marking a move to-
wards greater fetal rights as modernized medicine enabled a fetus to survive at an
earlier stage. See Kiasing, supra note 41, at 968. The Supreme Court, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), declared that abortion is no longer a fun-
damental right, replaced "strict scrutiny" with an "undue burden" test, and rejected
the three trimester approach. Id. at 836. This approach effectively allows state
regulation of abortion throughout pregnancy as long as it does not create an "undue
burden" on a woman. Id. Although Court decisions evolved to keep pace with mod-
ern science, leading to an increase in fetal rights, the Supreme Court continues to
maintain the core holding of Roe which established the viability line. In doing so, the
Court maintains a consistent line of demarcation in circumscribing criminal liabil-
ity. It is the mother, not the fetus, who is protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment right to privacy. Glink, supra note 47, at 562; Noller, supra note 44, at 386.
n Glink, supra note 47, at 563-66.
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woman. While the historic decision by the Justices in Roe
protect a woman's freedom of choice in the initial stages of
her pregnancy, it also permits state intervention in the
pregnancy's final stages.7 3 In the past, states have even or-
dered invasive medical procedures during late pregnancy,
such as cesarean sections and blood transfusions, over the
objections of women in order to protect a fetus. 4 Such cases
evidence the drive toward greater fetal rights, illustrating
that the health of the fetus often takes precedence over a
woman's right to bodily autonomy. 5  Compared to such in-
vasive surgical procedures, proscribing maternal drug use
during pregnancy is a minimal intrusion upon a woman's
rights.
Cornelia Whitner could have exercised her constitu-
tional right to have an abortion, but she did not. By decid-
ing to carry her fetus to term, Whitner accepted the greater
duty imposed upon her by law to ensure the delivery of a
healthy child.76 A viable fetus is a "presently existing per-
Nancy Grace, Individual Rights: Is the Prosecution of "Fetal Endangerment"
Illegitimate?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 72-73; see also Davidson, supra note 39, at 1
(explaining that Roe ruling permits state intervention after first trimester, making
restrictions after this time constitutional).71 See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 617 (D.C. 1987) (ordering cesarean section
against wishes of terminally ill mother); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp.
Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (Ga. 1981) (ordering cesarean section over mother's
religious objection); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201
A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964) (ordering that woman receive blood transfusions despite
religious beliefs); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)
(same). The Jefferson court declared that the "state's interest in protecting potential
life outweighed mother's right to bodily integrity and to practice her religion." Id.
States have also ordered such procedures to protect individual and public health.
See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905) (weighing individ-
ual's right to refuse vaccinations against state interest in public health).
7* See Timothy Sean McBride, Criminal Law - Should States Criminally Prose-
cute Mothers for Delivering Drugs to Their Newborns During the Birthing Process?:
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992), 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 251, 253
(1993).
76 See Greater S.E. Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 398 (D.C. 1984)
(stating that every child has right to be born healthy); Jarvis v. Providence Hosp.,
444 N.W.2d 236, 238-39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (declaring that every child has right
to be born with healthy mind and body); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1980) (same); Department of Social Servs. v. Felicia B., 543 N.Y.S.2d 637,
638 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1989) (holding mother liable for ingesting cocaine during preg-
nancy because of "the legal right of every human being to begin life unimpaired by
physical, mental, or emotional defects resulting from the neglectful acts of the par-
ent"); McBride, supra note 75, at 253; Carlson, supra note 5, at A9 (implying that
carrying pregnancy to term entails responsibilities); see also Denniston, supra note
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son" and thereby entitled to legal protection.77 Public policy
considerations dictate that courts treat prenatal substance
abuse consistently with abortion law by only allowing state
intervention after the first trimester.78 While the Constitu-
tion does not prohibit first trimester intervention in drug
abuse, it is logically consistent for states to follow Roe and
not intervene until the point of viability.79 The viability line
maintains the separateness of the two areas of law; other-
wise, "the ostensibly culpable conduct of abuse would go
unpunished if a woman exercised her right to abortion
during the same time period."" Thus, adhering to the con-
stitutional dividing line of viability allows the Whitner and
Roe line of cases to peacefully coexist.
IV. CRIMINAL LIABILITY CONFINED TO ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES
A recurring argument posited by Whitner opponents is
that liability for cocaine ingestion during pregnancy would
then extend to liability for smoking or drinking during
pregnancy or even failing to seek proper medical care.81 A
4, at 1A (stating that "[wihen there is a child who is to be born and is not going to be
aborted, and when there is a direct and severe threat to the health or life of the
child, the state can intervene to protect the child") (quoting Clarke Forsythe, presi-
dent of the Chicago-based Americans United for Life). Once a woman chooses to
continue a pregnancy she is charged with a "duty to care" for the fetus in her womb
to ensure that it is born with a "sound mind and body." DANIELS, supra note 17, at 3
(citing Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960)); Noller, supra note 44, at 387.
An analogy can be made to the Good Samaritan rule in tort law: there is no obliga-
tion to help but once you begin assisting, you have a duty to continue. Denison, su-
pra note 49, at 1127.
77 Shekey, supra note 66, at 368 (citing Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vt.,
Inc., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt. 1980)).
7" See, e.g., Lichtenberg, supra note 58, at 377. But see Glink, supra note 47, at
564 (declaring that state has greater interest in preventing future suffering of those
who will be born than it does in deciding whether baby will be born so state should
have power to regulate maternal conduct through entire term of pregnancy). Glink
asserts that, while Roe addresses the right to life, child abuse cases address the
rightto quality of life. Id.
See Lichtenberg, supra note 58, at 388.
Denison, supra note 49, at 1126. But see Chan, supra note 44, at 233 n.231
(positing fairness argument which posits that state cannot prosecute addicts in late
pregnancy but not prosecute pregnant addicts who have abortions because the latter
absolve themselves of liability while causing even greater harm to child than for-
mer).8; See Whitner, 1996 S.C. LEXIS 120, at *30-33 (Finney, C.J., and Moore, A.J.,
dissenting); see also Reinesto v. Superior Ct. of Ariz., 894 P.2d 733, 737 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that child abuse statute does not apply to prenatal conduct
[heroin use] that harms fetus); Sheriff of Washoe County v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596,
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more absurd argument is that further criminalizing drug
use opens the door to the extension of liability for all po-
tentially harmful maternal conduct such as jogging, eating
fattening or high cholesterol foods, or reckless driving.82
Drugs are illegal. Drinking, smoking, and eating fat-
tening foods are not. Opponents argue that, if the purpose
of criminal prosecution is to prevent fetal harm, then alco-
hol use and other harmful conduct by pregnant women
must also be outlawed.' Drinking is a socially acceptable
vice, they argue, whereas drug abuse is narrowly viewed as
a plague of the urban poor that must be eradicated." These
critics, however, fail to see the slippery slope that they have
created with such arguments. Illegal activities constitute
clearly defined categories, thereby satisfying the due proc-
ess requirement of fair notice.' True discrimination would
597 (Nev. 1994) (concluding that it would be overbroad interpretation of child en-
dangerment statute to prosecute mother for delivering drugs to fetus through um-
bilical cord). The Encoe court feared that such a construction would include all of a
pregnant woman's conduct, including use of legal substances like alcohol and nico-
tine. Id. at 597. "Any further extension of legal protection for the unborn, even for
fetuses in the latter stages of pregnancy, is seen as a slippery slope that will erode a
pregnant woman's ability to make her own decisions." See Carlson, supra note 5, at
A9 (comparing Whitner outcome to factually similar case that was dismissed in
Washington and calling for state to model South Carolina decision).
82 See, e.g., Anne Marie O'Neill, et al., Under the Influence, PEOPLE, Sept. 9,
1996, at 53-55 (commentary on Deborah Zimmerman case).
" See Lichtenberg, supra note 58, at 387 (explaining that state must treat abuse
of alcohol same as abuse of drugs because both involve maternal addictions that en-
danger fetus). Smoking can cause low birth weight; alcohol consumption can cause
fetal alcohol syndrome which is characterized by mental retardation and growth de-
ficiencies; an improper diet can cause premature births; and caffeine can cause low
birth weight. Freeman, supra note 29, at 556. Critics fear such activities may also be
subject to judicial scrutiny.
' See McGinnis, supra note 43, at 535. As a consequence, opponents argue,
prosecutors discriminate based on class. Id. Additionally, low income, minority
women are reported far more frequently than their prosperous counterparts because
medical personnel often administer drug tests based on such class presumptions.
See Sexton, supra note 24, at 427.
8 See Glink, supra note 47, at 570 (explaining that statute proscribing all po-
tentially harmful conduct, including legal activities, would be too vague, but one
narrowly proscribing conduct that is already illegal would satisfy constitutional re-
quirements). "The state should be able to invade a woman's right to bodily integrity
and personal autonomy only when conduct being regulated is illegal. To conclude
otherwise would allow a state to deny a pregnant woman the right to make choices
that affect her body." Id.; see, e.g., California v. Stewart, No. M508197 (San Diego
Mun. Ct. 1987) (dismissing charge against pregnant woman who disobeyed her doc-
tor's orders by engaging in sexual intercourse). But see Denison, supra note 49, at
1125 (arguing that legislatures have every right to declare activities legal in one
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occur if criminal liability extended to activities like smoking
and drinking. These are activities which the general
population enjoys and they cannot be denied to a woman
simply because she is pregnant.86 There exists a clear line
between harmful and unlawful conduct.
Opponents also assert that criminalizing maternal drug
use would discourage women from seeking prenatal care for
fear of being prosecuted. 7 This ignores the reality, how-
ever, that, for crack addicts, medical care, for themselves or
their unborn children, is not a priority.' Other reasons ex-
ist, such as shame or lack of money to spare from their ex-
pensive habit, which may prevent such addicted women
from seeking proper prenatal care. 9 Criminal prosecutions
of these women are the only true deterrent to maternal
drug abuse."
context and illegal in another, for example, public nuisance or drunk driving). Crit-
ics believe that a law declaring smoking or drinking illegal under the attendant cir-
cumstance of pregnancy would parallel these existing, non-vague statutes. Id.
' See Glink, supra note 47, at 568. An individual cannot be punished for his
status as an addict under the 8th Amendment, absent a criminal act. See, e.g., Rob-
inson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
87 See Abuse of Viable Fetus Ruled a Crime, supra note 20, at A8. Patients will
be distrustful of health care personnel and will not speak openly about drug use.
Roper, supra note 66, at 180. Further, a mandatory reporting requirement would
undermine the confidential doctor/patient relationship. Glink, supra note 47, at 546.
'3 See Noller, supra note 44, at 388 (stating that substance abuse is one of many
poor health habits of addicted women, as well as failure to seek adequate medical
care).
S Id.
See Deborah Ann Bailey, Maternal Substance Abuse: Does Ohio Have an An-
swer?, 17 DAYTON L. REV. 1019, 1034 n.137 (arguing that civil penalties, such as
taking custody of child after birth, are inadequate because damage occurs in utero
but criminal prosecution can take place during pregnancy); Elizabeth L. Thompson,
The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking
Model for Lawmakers, 64 IND. L.J. 357, 367 n.83 (1988) (positing morality argument
as justification for imprisonment because such punishment is "concrete expression
of society's disapproval of an act [which] helps to form and to strengthen the public's
moral code and thereby creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against
committing crimes"). Bailey further explains that the threat of losing custody of a
child is not enough to deter women from using drugs. Id. But see Freeman, supra
note 29, at 556 (explaining that criminal prosecutions will increase abortions which,
although legal, are counterproductive to state interest in preserving life); Glink, su-
pra note 47, at 572 (stating that incarceration serves no purpose because woman's
past drug use poses no danger to society); Lichtenberg, supra note 58, at 378
(stating that civil commitment of mother after first trimester is better solution be-
cause it lacks punitive aspects of imprisonment and is long-term solution); McGin-
is, supra note 43, at 539 (arguing that money would be better spent prosecuting
drug dealers, source of problem); Phillips, supra note 49, at 557 (stating that reme-
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Liability from a policy standpoint must be confined to
illegal activities. Women have no legal right to use illicit
drugs, 91 such as cocaine; they do, however, have a legal
right to drink or smoke after a certain age.92 Illegal drug
use, on its own, is criminally actionable. 3 Voluntary drug
use94 that injures a viable fetus must, therefore, also be
dies for pregnant drug abusers must be combination of prenatal care and drug
treatment in order to reflect interdependence between woman and fetus); Roper,
supra note 66, at 171 (suggesting criminal statute mandating drug rehabilitation for
pregnant drug addicts and imposing incarceration only upon refusal); Thompson,
supra, at 370-71 (relating societal costs which include: imposing affirmative duty on
doctors to report patients who fail to follow advice, effectively making fetus more
important patient than woman; and destroying family unit by putting mother in
jail); Zitella, supra note 54, at 795 (stating that less intrusive means than impris-
onment can protect fetuses, such as education and drug treatment programs for
pregnant women). The American Medical Association believes that drug addiction is
an illness and should not be prosecuted. See Roper, supra note 66, at 176; Carlson,
supra note 5, at A9; cf GREEN, supra note 23, at 86 (1993) (stating that criminaliz-
ing maternal drug use will only push women away from drug treatment, not scare
them into seeking treatment). "Deterrence assumes an ability to change behavior
through rational choice - the actor weighs the costs and benefits of his actions in an
effort to determine whether or not to act." Roper, supra note 66, at 178; Thompson,
supra, at 366 (emphasizing utility of imprisonment as both general deterrent,
causing general population to follow law, and specific deterrent, preventing further
harmful activity from this particular individual). The threat of mandatory drug
treatment or education will not deter drug users. Id. But see McGinnis, supra note
43, at 523 (positing that drug addiction is involuntary and that involuntary conduct
cannot be deterred). The only behavior that will be deterred is the "voluntary" deci-
sion to seek medical care, precisely the opposite aim of prosecutors. Roper, supra
note 66, at 180; Zitella, supra note 54, at 790 (claiming that criminal prosecutions
cannot practically serve as deterrent because crack addicts cannot control their ad-
dictions).
9' See State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Ariz. 1977) (declaring that mari-
juana use is not fundamental right); Freeman, supra note 29, at 563. Freeman em-
phasizes the importance of this argument by comparing the competing interests of
abortion and cocaine use. He explains that a woman has a legal right to an abortion
before viability and that a state must balance the interests of protecting the fetus
and preserving the mother's right to privacy. Id. Since there is no legal right to use
cocaine, the balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court need not take place. Id.
(citing State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 714 (Ohio 1992) (Wright, J., dissenting)).
See Sam S. Bailey, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Pro-
tection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1987) (noting that all women have
equal rights to consume alcohol and smoke cigarettes).
' Prosecutors would simply be clarifying a statute that already applies to every
individual. Currently, no one may make, dispense, or possess controlled substances.
21 U.S.C.S. § 841 (West 1994).
9 See Bailey, supra note 92, at 1041 (positing that "a woman's initial use of co-
caine, with the knowledge that she is pregnant, is a voluntary act and, therefore,
she may be subject to prosecution"); Chan, supra note 44, at 232 (confirming that
pregnant women who abuse drugs make deliberate choice and cannot use excuse
that drug addiction is disease). "While rapists, shoplifters, and other offenders may
[Vol. 71:667
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punished criminally and society cannot rely upon current
drug laws alone.95
CONCLUSION
Society's most precious commodity is its children. The
alarming increase in infants born addicted to drugs necessi-
tates severe penalties for those individuals who are re-
sponsible for such suffering. Tragically, mothers comprise
this class of abusive individuals. Thus, the alleviation of
such suffering necessitates the criminalization of maternal
drug use. Simply relying upon current drug laws for use or
possession, laws that focus purely on an addict's self abuse,
have not only proven ineffective, but they also ignore the
crime perpetrated on another individual, the fetus. A preg-
nant drug abuser must not be treated the same as any
other drug abuser. From a biological standpoint, a woman's
liability must begin at viability of the fetus. Drawing the
line at viability enables the courts to prevent substantial
fetal harm while at the same time respecting the abortion
rights established in Roe v. Wade. Criminal prosecutions of
pregnant drug abusers will promote three societal values:
punishing knowing criminal conduct that injures another,
protecting a viable fetus from further harm, and most im-
portantly, deterring other pregnant women from taking
that first hit of cocaine. Only by fostering such values can
society hope to protect all viable children from the effects of
drug abuse. There is strong support for the court's holding
in Whitner that a fetus is a person under child abuse law.
This will likely spark a continued march in the direction of
fetal rights.
Regina M. Coady*
have a mental or psychological 'disease,' this does not affect society's mandate to
prosecute such people and criminalize their conduct." Id.; Sexton, supra note 24, at
411 (declaring that real issue is accountability and drug addiction must not be valid
excuse for behavior damaging fetus).
" But see Roper, supra note 66, at 187 (stating that focus must be on preventing
drug use in general because this would ultimately decrease numbers of all drug ad-
dicts, including pregnant women).
. I would like to dedicate this article to Christine Allen and Jim Farrell in sin-
cerest thanks for their friendship and support throughout my time at St. John's Law
School.
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